Supreme Court, U.S.
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No. 07-181

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

BRUCE TURNER,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The First Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

BRUCE TURNER
Pro Se
U.S.P. Coleman 1 No. 24622-038
P.O. Box 1033
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. In light of this Court's recent decision in *Cunningham v. California,* 549 U.S. ___ (2007) is defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right violated when he is sentenced to a minimum mandatory prison term under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because he is found at sentencing to have three (3) prior felony convictions (either violent crime or serious drug offenses) by a Judge but not mentioned to the Jury at trial.

2. Does the *Almendarez-Torres,* 549 U.S. ___ (2007) "prior conviction exception" apply to a defendant whose sentence has been enhanced (by a Judges finding) under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) i.e. three (3) prior felony convictions, when the defendant went to trial before a Jury in violation of 922(g)(1) (felon in possession of a firearm with one prior felony conviction and was convicted of only that violation).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Questions Presented	i
Table of Contents	ii
Table of Authorities	iii
Opinion Below	1
Jurisdiction	1
Relevant Constitutional and Statutory Provisions	1
Statement of the Case	2
Reasons Why The Writ Should be Granted	3
Conclusion	6
Appendix A – Opinion of the Court of Appeals	App. 1
Appendix B – Decision of the District Court	App. 4

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998) 4, 5, 6

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) 5

Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004) 6

Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. ___ (2007) 4, 5

Shepard v. United States, 125 S.Ct. 1254 (2005) 4, 5

State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) 6

United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005) 6

United States v. Paige, (citation omitted) (1st Cir. 2005) 5

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Amendment VI 1, 4

Amendment XIV 4

STATUTES

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) 1, 2, 3

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(2) 1, 2

18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) 2

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) 2, 3, 4, 5

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) 1

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Bruce Turner respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals of the First Circuit entered in this case.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit is found at Appendix A and is an unpublished decision of that court. The Relevant sentencing findings of the District Court are found at Appendix B.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on April 18, 2007. This petition is timely filed within ninety days of that date. This Court's jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

United States Constitution, Amendment VI

> In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . .

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and section 2

> (g) It shall be unlawful for any person – (1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term

exceeding one year; section 2 – to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2)

Whoever knowingly violates subsection . . . (g) . . . of section 922 shall be fined as provided in this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)

In the case of a person who violates 922(g) of this title and has three previous convictions . . . for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both . . . , such person shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not less than fifteen years, and notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall not suspend the sentence of, or grant a probationary sentence of, such person with respect to the conviction under section 922(g).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On May 14, 2003, a Grand Jury returned a one-count indictment against Mr. Bruce Turner charging him with being a felon in possession of two firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) along with co-defendant Ronald G. Smith with Aiding and Abetting said possession. Eight (8) months later, on November 5, 2003, a superseding indictment was returned dismissing co-defendant Smith from the indictment in return for his cooperation against Mr. Turner. The superseding indictment expanded the time frame of possession by approximately one (1) month and did allege that the defendant comported with the statute

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), a non-violent crime; by including had "previously been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one (1) year." Notably, the indictment did not allege, that Mr. Turner had been convicted of three (3) prior and separate crimes which constitutes violent felonies or serious drug trafficking crimes.

On January 20, 2004, Mr. Turner proceeded to trial before the Honorable Judge Patti B. Saris and a jury. The jury returned a guilty verdict on January 23, 2004 only for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Note: the jury heard no facts pertaining to the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) Enhancements, nor did Mr. Turner plea to them. On November 1, 2004, Mr. Turner was sentenced to 235 months (19.5 years) to be followed by 60 months of supervised release. Mr. Turner timely filed his appeal and on March 1, 2006, that court ruled that the case be remanded to the District Court for re-sentencing in accord with its decision. On July 17, 2006, Mr. Turner was re-sentenced by the Honorable Judge Patti Saris to 211 months (17.5 years) and advised by the District Court of his right to appeal. Mr. Turner timely filed his Notice of Appeal. The Court of Appeals entered a judgment affirming the District Court's ruling of July 17, 2006 on April 18, 2007.

REASONS WHY THE WRIT SHOULD BE GRANTED

The petitioner, Mr. Turner, respectfully urges this Honorable Court to grant this petition for issuance of a writ of certiorari to clarify the issue of the use of prior convictions for sentencing enhancement; when those

alleged prior convictions are not alleged in the indictment, plead to or proven by a Jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

Previously in the case of *Almendarez-Torres v. United States,* 523 U.S. 224 (1998), this Court determined the fact of a prior conviction was not an element of the offense and did not have to be alleged in the indictment and proven by the government. 523 U.S. at 235.

Subsequent to *Almendarez-Torres,* this Court's ruling in *Shepard v. United States,* 125 S.Ct. 1254 (2005), the Honorable Justice Thomas, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, wrote "*Almendarez-Torres* was wrongly decided." Moreover, in this Court's recent 2007 ruling in *Cunningham v. California,* 549 U.S. ___ (2007), the Honorable Justice Ginsberg, delivering the opinion, wrote "The question presented is whether the DSL (Determinate Sentencing Law), by placing sentence elevating fact-finding within the judge's province, violates a defendant's right to Trial by Jury Safeguarded by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment. We hold that it does."

The issue in *Cunningham* is the same as that of the petitioner's case. The DSL was California's determinate sentencing Law enacted by the state legislature to enhance recidivist behavior.

The DSL is the functional equivalent to the federal recidivist statute of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) requiring minimum mandatory sentence enhancements above the promulgated statutory maximum for the crime convicted. "Because the DSL allocates to Judges sole authority to find facts permitting the imposition of an upper term sentence, the system violates the Sixth Amendment." *Cunningham v. California,* 549 U.S. ___ (2007).

In lieu of this Court's subsequent rulings since *Almendarez-Torres*, as mentioned herein, this Court should grant Certiorari to clarify this extremely important constitutional issue, specifically as it relates to the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) Enhancements which recur frequently throughout the country in all U.S. Circuits. Moreover, since many circuits including the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in their rulings are refusing to address the issue while noting the petitioner's preservation by stating: "we will not anticipate an overruling or a sharp limitation of *Almendarez-Torres* by the Supreme Court," *Turner v. U.S.*, First Circuit Decision dated April 18, 2007 unpublished.

In essence, the circuit courts are refusing to address the constitutional violations until this Court steps up and directly addresses the issue head on with respect to the ACCA sentencing Enhancement. This further substantiates the importance of this issue as it relates to the constitutional infringement of liberties for many throughout the country. One particular case comes to mind in the First Circuit which sums up the vast majority of the other Circuits' reasoning for not wanting to address this issue even in light of Justice Thomas' finding that "a majority of the courts now recognize that *Almendarez-Torres* was wrongly decided." *Shepard v. United States,* 125 S.Ct. at 1264 and Justice Ginsberg's opinion in *Cunningham v. California,* 549 U.S. ___ (2007). That case is *United States v. Paige,* (citation omitted) First Circuit Court of Appeals judgment entered on August 31, 2005, in which the court reasoned the petitioner's sentence did not violate the Sixth Amendment and wrote: "The Supreme Court has, however, consistent with *Almendarez-Torres,* explicitly accepted prior convictions from its holdings in *Apprendi*, 530 U.S.

at 489, *Blakely*, 124 S.Ct. at 2536 and *Booker,* 125 S.Ct. at 156 [sic]," and "it is [the Supreme] Court's prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents, *State Oil Co. v. Khan,* 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) [citation omitted]; *Almendarez-Torres* continues to be good law, and therefore, prior convictions are not facts that must be admitted by defendant or proven beyond a reasonable doubt."

Petitioner, Mr. Turner, strongly urges this Court to grant certiorari and consider abrogation of *Almendarez-Torres* to eliminate the confusion, lack of consistency, and constitutional infirmity which exists among the Circuit Courts' rulings.

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, petitioner respectfully requests that this Honorable Court grant this Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.

Respectfully submitted by

BRUCE TURNER
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P.O. Box 1033
Coleman, FL 33521

Dated: July 30, 2007.

Resubmitted: August 9, 2007.

APPENDIX A

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit

No. 06-2207

UNITED STATES,

Appellee,

v.

BRUCE TURNER,

Defendant, Appellant.

Before

Boudin, *Chief Judge*,
Torruella and Howard, *Circuit Judges*.

JUDGMENT

Entered: April 18, 2007

Defendant-appellant Bruce Turner appeals from the sentence imposed upon him under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) for being a felon in possession of a firearm. *See* 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g), 924(e). The government has moved for summary disposition pursuant to our Local Rule 27.0. Defendant opposes the government's motion as an unsuitable shortcut around full briefing, but we conclude that the pleadings before us are sufficient for a decision on the merits.

Turner first argues that the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in *Cunningham v. California*, 127 S.Ct. 856 (2007) (striking down California's sentencing regime) re-opens the question of whether

Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998) is still good law. He further argues that the ACCA's limitation of predicate convictions to "violent" felonies or "serious" drug offenses implicates factual issues that must be treated according to the rule of *Apprendi v. New Jersey*, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Turner has made clear that he intends to preserve his arguments in the face of existing law, and we acknowledge his right to do so. However, we will not anticipate an overruling or a sharp limitation of *Almendarez-Torres* by the Supreme Court. Neither the *Cunningham* decision nor the noted provisions of the ACCA change our view.

Although Turner received a prison term two years below the applicable guideline range, he contends that the district court imposed an unreasonably severe sentence by focusing too much attention on his recidivism to the exclusion of other relevant factors and by improperly considering a cargo theft conviction for which he received a separate, concurrent federal sentence of only eighteen months' imprisonment. The transcript belies Turner's contentions. Judge Saris heard arguments from both sides that addressed a wide range of sentencing considerations. She then explained that she would sentence below the guideline range, but was unwilling to go all the way down to the statutory mandatory minimum in light of Turner's record of recidivism and the cargo-theft conviction for which he received "a break" as to the length of imprisonment. The substantial weight that Judge Saris accorded factors militating towards lenience is implicit in her decision to sentence below the guideline range. Context makes clear that Turner's recidivism and his cargo-theft conviction were specifically noted by Judge Saris because they were two factors that persuaded her not to sentence at the statutory mandatory minimum (as she recalled having done in a previous case). The specific mention

these two factors received during the sentencing hearing does not indicate that other sentencing factors were ignored or discounted. The district court's conclusion that Turner's criminal record militated in favor of a sentence substantially above the statutory minimum was certainly reasonable.

Insofar as Turner contends that the district court increased the present sentence as a way of compensating for the relatively short prison term he received for the cargo theft, we conclude he misreads the record. The cargo theft was of a piece with Turner's general history of recidivism, and it was a much more serious offense than the prison term imposed reflects. The district court, in considering the significance of Turner's criminal history, could take note that it included an additional theft crime which, despite the light sentence it garnered, was quite serious.

The government's motion for summary disposition is *allowed*. The judgment is *affirmed*.

By the Court:

Richard Cushing Donovan,
Clerk.

By: Amy B. Lederer
Appeals Attorney.

Certified and Issued
as Mandate under
Fed. R. App. P. 41.

Richard Cushing Donovan,
Clerk

/s/ [Illegible]
Deputy Clerk

Date: 5/10/07

[cc: Raymond Mansolillo, Esq., John Capin, AUSA,
Dina Chaitowitz, AUSA]

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
District of Massachusetts

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	**AMENDED JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE**
V.	Case Number: **1: 03 CR 10166-001-PBS**
BRUCE TURNER	USM Number: 24622-038
	Robert L. Sheketoff, Esq.
	Defendant's Attorney

☐ Additional documents attached

Date of Original Judgment: 11/1/04

☑ Case remanded for resentencing in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)

THE DEFENDANT:

☐ pleaded guilty to count(s) _____

☐ pleaded nolo contendere to count(s) _____ which was accepted by the court.

☑ was found guilty on count(s) 1 of a Superseding Indictment after a plea of not guilty.

The defendant is adjudicated guilty of these offenses:

Additional Counts – See continuation page ☐

Title & Section	Nature of Offense	Offense Ended	Count
18 USC § 922(g)(1)	Felon in Possession of a Firearm	01/24/03	1s

The defendant is sentenced as provided in pages 2 through 9 of this judgment. The sentence is imposed pursuant to the Sentencing Reform act of 1984.

☐ The defendant has been found not guilty on count(s) _____

☐ Count(s) _____ ☐ is ☐ are dismissed on the motion of the United States.

It is ordered that the defendant shall notify the United States attorney for this district within 30 days of any change of name, residence, or mailing address until all fines, restitution, costs, and special assessments imposed by this judgment are fully paid. If ordered to pay restitution, the defendant must notify the court and United States attorney of any material changes in economic circumstances.

07/17/06
Date of Imposition of Judgment

/s/ Patti B. Saris
Signature of Judge

The Honorable Patti B. Saris
Judge, U.S. District Court
Name and Title of Judge

7/19/06
Date

IMPRISONMENT

The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a total term of: 211 month(s)

☐ The court makes the following recommendations to the Bureau of Prisons:

A recommendation to FMC Devens and the 500 Drug Treatment Program.

☑ The defendant is remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal.

☐ The defendant shall surrender to the United States Marshal for this district:
☐ at _____ ☐ a.m. ☐ p.m. on _____.

☐ as notified by the United States Marshal.

☐ The defendant shall surrender for service of sentence at the institution designated by the Bureau of Prisons:

☐ before 2 p.m. on _____

☐ as notified by the United States Marshal.

☐ as notified by the Probation or Pretrial Services Office.

RETURN

I have executed this judgment as follows:

Defendant delivered on _____ to _____
a _____, with a certified copy of this judgment.

_____
UNITED STATES MARSHAL

_____
By DEPUTY UNITED STATES MARSHAL

SUPERVISED RELEASE

☐ See continuation page

Upon release from imprisonment, the defendant shall be on supervised release for a term of: 60 month(s).

Defendant is to participate in substance abuse testing and treatment.

Defendant is to participate in mental health counseling.

The defendant must report to the probation office in the district to which the defendant is released within 72 hours of release from the custody of the Bureau of Prisons.

The defendant shall not commit another federal, state or local crime.

The defendant shall not unlawfully possess a controlled substance. The defendant shall refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance. The defendant shall submit to one drug test within 15 days of release from imprisonment and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter, not to exceed 104 tests per year, as directed by the probation officer.

☐ The above drug testing condition is suspended, based on the court's determination that the defendant poses a low risk of future substance abuse. (Check, if applicable.)

☐ The defendant shall not possess a firearm, ammunition, destructive device, or any other dangerous weapon. (Check, if applicable.)

☐ The defendant shall cooperate in the collection of DNA as directed by the probation officer. (Check, if applicable.)

☐ The defendant shall register with the state sex offender registration agency in the state where the defendant resides, works, or is a student, as directed by the probation officer. (Check, if applicable.)

☐ The defendant shall participate in an approved program for domestic violence. (Check, if applicable.)

If this judgment imposes a fine or restitution, it is a condition of supervised release that the defendant pay in accordance with the Schedule of Payments sheet of this judgment.

The defendant must comply with the standard conditions that have been adopted by this court as well as with any additional conditions on the attached page.

STANDARD CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

1) the defendant shall not leave the judicial district without the permission of the court or probation officer;

2) the defendant shall report to the probation officer and shall submit a truthful and complete written report within the first five days of each month;

3) the defendant shall answer truthfully all inquiries by the probation officer and follow the instructions of the probation officer;

4) the defendant shall support his or her dependents and meet other family responsibilities;

5) the defendant shall work regularly at a lawful occupation, unless excused by the probation officer for schooling, training, or other acceptable reasons;

6) the defendant shall notify the probation officer at least ten days prior to any change in residence or employment;

7) the defendant shall refrain from excessive use of alcohol and shall not purchase, possess, use, distribute, or administer any controlled substance or any paraphernalia related to any controlled substances, except as prescribed by a physician;

8) the defendant shall not frequent places where controlled substances are illegally sold, used, distributed, or administered;

9) the defendant shall not associate with any persons engaged in criminal activity, and shall not associate with any person convicted of a felony, unless granted permission to do so by the probation officer;

10) the defendant shall permit a probation officer to visit him or her at any time at home or elsewhere and shall permit confiscation of any contraband observed in plain view of the probation officer;

11) the defendant shall notify the probation officer within seventy-two hours of being arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer;

12) the defendant shall not enter into any agreement to act as an informer or a special agent of a law enforcement agency without the permission of the court; and

13) as directed by the probation officer, the defendant shall notify third parties of risks that may be occasioned by the defendant's criminal record or personal history or characteristics, and shall permit the probation officer to make such notifications and to confirm the defendant's compliance with such notification requirement.

CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES

The defendant must pay the total criminal monetary penalties under the schedule of payments on Sheet 6.

	Assessment	Fine	Restitution
TOTALS	$ 100.00	$	$

☐ The determination of restitution is deferred until _____. An *Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case* (AO 245C) will be entered after such determination.

☐ The defendant must make restitution (including community restitution) to the following payees in the amount listed below.

If the defendant makes a partial payment, each payee shall receive an approximately proportioned payment, unless specified otherwise in the priority order or percentage payment column below. However, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3664(i), all nonfederal victims must be paid before the United States is paid.

Name of Payee	Total Loss*	Restitution Ordered	Priority or Percentage
			☐ See Continuation Page
TOTALS	$ 0.00	$ 0.00	

☐ Restitution amount ordered pursuant to plea agreement $ _____

☐ The defendant must pay interest on restitution and a fine of more than $2,500, unless the restitution or fine is paid in full before the fifteenth day after the date of the judgment, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f). All of the payment options on Sheet 6, may be subject to penalties for delinquency and default, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(g).

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* Findings for the total amount of losses are required under Chapters 109A, 110, 110A, and 113A of Title 18, for offenses committed on or after September 13, 1994 but before April 23, 1996.

☐ The court determined that the defendant does not have the ability to pay interest, and it is ordered that:

☐ the interest requirement is waived for the ☐ fine ☐ restitution.

☐ the interest requirement for the ☐ fine ☐ restitution is modified as follows:

SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS

Having assessed the defendant's ability to pay, payment of the total criminal monetary penalties are due as follows:

A ☐ Lump sum payment of $ _____ due immediately, balance due

☐ not later than _____ , or
☐ in accordance ☐ C, ☐ D, ☐ E, or ☐ F below; or

B ☐ Payment to begin immediately (may be combined with ☐ C, ☐ D or, ☐ F below); or

C ☐ Payment in equal _____ (e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of $ _____ over a period of _____ (e.g., months or years), to commence _____ (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after the date of this judgment; or

D ☐ Payment in equal _____ (e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of $ _____ over a period of _____ (e.g., months or years), to commence _____ (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after release from imprisonment to a term of supervision; or

E ☐ Payment during the term of supervised release will commence within _____ (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after release from imprisonment. The court will set the payment plan based on an assessment of the defendant's ability to pay at that time; or

F ☒ Special instructions regarding the payment of criminal monetary penalties:

The $100.00 Special Assessment is due immediately (unless already paid).

Unless the court has expressly ordered otherwise, if this judgment imposes imprisonment, payment of criminal monetary penalties is due during imprisonment. All criminal monetary penalties, except those payments made through the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Inmate Financial Responsibility Program, are made to the clerk of the court.

The defendant shall receive credit for all payments previously made toward any criminal monetary penalties imposed.

☐ See Continuation Page

☐ Joint and Several

Defendant and Co-Defendant Names and Case Numbers (including defendant number), Total Amount, Joint and Several Amount, and corresponding payee, if appropriate.

☐ The defendant shall pay the cost of prosecution.

☐ The defendant shall pay the following court cost(s):

☐ The defendant shall forfeit the defendant's interest in the following property to the United States:

Payments shall be applied in the following order: (1) assessment, (2) restitution principal, (3) restitution interest, (4) fine principal, (5) fine interest, (6) community restitution, (7) penalties, and (8) costs, including cost of prosecution and court costs.

STATEMENT OF REASONS

I COURT FINDINGS ON PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT

A ☑ **The court adopts the presentence investigation report without change.**

B ☐ **The court adopts the presentence investigation report with the following changes.**

(Check all that apply and specify court determination, findings, or comments, referencing paragraph numbers in the presentence report, if applicable.) (Use Section VIII if necessary.)

1 ☐ **Chapter Two of the U.S.S.G. Manual** determinations by court (including changes to base offense level, or specific offense characteristics):

2 ☐ **Chapter Three of the U.S.S.G. Manual** determinations by court (including changes to victim-related adjustments, role in the offense, obstruction of justice, multiple counts, or acceptance of responsibility):

3 ☐ **Chapter Four of the U.S.S.G. Manual** determinations by court (including changes to criminal history category or scores, career offender, or criminal livelihood determinations):

4 ☐ **Additional Comments or Findings** (including comments or factual findings concerning certain information in the presentence report that the Federal Bureau of Prisons may rely on when it makes inmate classification, designation, or programming decisions):

C ☐ **The record establishes no need for a presentence investigation report pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.**

II **COURT FINDING ON MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCE** (Check all that apply.)

A ☐ No count of conviction carries a mandatory minimum sentence.

B ☑ Mandatory minimum sentence is imposed.

C ☐ One or more counts of conviction alleged in the indictment carry a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, but the sentence imposed is below a mandatory minimum term because the court has determined that the mandatory minimum does not apply based on

☐ findings of fact in this case

☐ substantial assistance (18 U.S.C. § 3553(e))

☐ the statutory safety valve (18 U.S.C. § 3553(f))

III **COURT DETERMINATION OF ADVISORY GUIDELINE RANGE (BEFORE DEPARTURES):**

Total Offense Level: 23
Criminal History Category: VI
Imprisonment Range: 235 to 293 months
Supervised Release Range: 2 to 3 years
Fine Range: $7,500 to $75,000

☑ Fine waived or below the guideline range because of inability to pay.

IV **ADVISORY GUIDELINE SENTENCING DETERMINATION** (Check only one.)

A ☐ **The sentence is within an advisory guideline range that is not greater than 24 months, and the court finds no reason to depart.**

B ☐ **The sentence is within an advisory guideline range that is greater than 24 months, and the specific sentence is imposed for these reasons.** (Use Section VIII if necessary.)

C ☐ **The court departs from the advisory guideline range for reasons authorized by the sentencing guidelines manual.** (Also complete Section V.)

D ☐ **The court imposed a sentence outside the advisory sentencing guideline system.** (Also complete Section VI.)

V **DEPARTURES AUTHORIZED BY THE ADVISORY SENTENCING GUIDELINES** (If applicable.)

A **The sentence imposed departs** (Check only one.):

☐ below the advisory guideline range

☐ above the advisory guideline range

B **Departure based on** (Check all that apply.):

1 **Plea Agreement** (Check all that apply and check reason(s) below.):

☐ 5K1.1 plea agreement based on the defendant's substantial assistance

☐ 5K3.1 plea agreement based on Early Disposition or "Fast-track" Program

☐ binding plea agreement for departure accepted by the court

☐ plea agreement for departure, which the court finds to be reasonable

☐ plea agreement that states that the government will not impose a defense departure motion.

2 **Motion Not Addressed in a Plea Agreement** (Check all that apply and check reason(s) below.):

☐ 5K1.1 government motion based on the defendant's substantial assistance.

☐ 5K3.1 government motion based on Early Disposition or "Fast-track" program

☐ government motion for departure

☐ defense motion for departure to which the government did not object

☐ defense motion for departure to which the government objected

3 **Other**

☐ Other than a plea agreement or motion by the parties for departure (Check reason(s) below.):

C **Reason(s) for Departure** (Check all that apply other than 5K1.1 or 5K3.1.)

☐ 4A1.3 Criminal History Inadequacy

☐ 5H1.1 Age

☐ 5H1.2 Education and Vocational Skills

☐ 5H1.3 Mental and Emotional Condition

☐ 5H1.4 Physical Condition

☐ 5H1.5 Employment Record

☐ 5H1.6 Family Ties and Responsibilities

☐ 5H1.11 Military Record, Charitable Service, Good Works

☐ 5K2.0 Aggravating or Mitigating Circumstances

☐ 5K2.1 Death

☐ 5K2.2 Physical Injury

☐ 5K2.3 Extreme Psychological Injury

☐ 5K2.4 Abduction or Unlawful Restraint

☐ 5K2.5 Property Damage or Loss

☐ 5K2.6 Weapon or Dangerous Weapon

☐ 5K2.7 Disruption of Government Function

☐ 5K2.8 Extreme Conduct

☐ 5K2.9 Criminal Purpose

☐ 5K2.10 Victim's Conduct

☐ 5K2.11 Lesser Harm

☐ 5K2.12 Coercion and Duress

☐ 5K2.13 Diminished Capacity

☐ 5K2.14 Public Welfare

☐ 5K2.16 Voluntary Disclosure of Offense

☐ 5K2.17 High-Capacity, Semiautomatic Weapon

☐ 5K2.18 Violent Street Gang

☐ 5K2.20 Aberrant Behavior

☐ 5K2.21 Dismissed and Uncharged Conduct

☐ 5K2.22 Age or Health of Sex Offenders

☐ 5K2.23 Discharged Terms of Imprisonment

☐ Other guideline basis (*e.g.*, 2B1.1 commentary)

D **Explain the facts justifying the departure.** (Use Section VIII if necessary.)

VI COURT DETERMINATION FOR SENTENCE OUTSIDE THE ADVISORY GUIDELINE SYSTEM (Check all that apply.)

A **The sentence imposed is** (Check only one.):

☑ below the advisory guideline range

☐ above the advisory guideline range

B **Sentence imposed pursuant to** (Check all that apply.):

1 **Plea Agreement** (Check all that apply and check reason(s) below.):

☐ binding plea agreement for a sentence outside the advisory guideline system accepted by the court

☐ plea agreement for a sentence outside the advisory guideline system, which the court finds to be reasonable

☐ plea agreement that states that the government will not impose a defense motion to the court to sentence outside the advisory guideline system

2 **Motion Not Addressed in a Plea Agreement** (Check all that apply and check reason(s) below.):

☐ government motion for a sentence outside of the advisory guideline system

☐ defense motion for a sentence outside of the advisory guideline system to which the government did not object

☑ defense motion for a sentence outside of the advisory guideline system to which the government objected

3 **Other**

☐ Other than a plea agreement or motion by the parties for a sentence outside of the advisory guideline system (Check reason(s) below.):

C **Reason(s) for Sentence Outside the Advisory Guideline System** (Check all that apply.)

☑ the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)

☐ to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense (18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A))

☐ to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct (18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B))

☐ to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant (18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C))

☐ to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner (18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D))

☐ to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants (18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6))

☐ to provide restitution to any victims of the offense (18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(7))

D **Explain the facts justifying a sentence outside the advisory guideline system.** (Use Section VIII if necessary.)

THIS CASE WAS REMANDED FOR RE-SENTENCING IN LIGHT OF BOOKER. I IMPOSED A SENTENCE OF 211 MONTHS RATHER THAN THE LOW-END GUIDELINE SENTENCE OF 235 MONTHS BECAUSE, AS I SAID IN THE INITIAL SENTENCING, THE GUIDELINE RANGE SEEMED DISPROPORTIONATELY HIGH GIVEN THE NATURE AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE UNDERLYING OFFENSE, I VARIED BY ONE OFFENSE LEVEL. I DID NOT VARY MUCH BECAUSE OF THE SERIOUS CRIMINAL HISTORY.

VII COURT DETERMINATIONS OF RESTITUTION

A ☐ Restitution Not Applicable.

B Total Amount of Restitution: _____

C Restitution not ordered (Check only one):

1 ☐ For offenses for which restitution is otherwise mandatory under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, restitution is not ordered because the number of identifiable victims is so large as to make restitution impracticable under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(3)(A).

2 ☐ For offenses for which restitution is otherwise mandatory under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, restitution is not ordered because determining complex issues of fact and relating them to the cause or amount of the victims' losses would complicate or prolong the sentencing process to a degree that the need to provide restitution to any victim would be outweighed by the burden on the sentencing process under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(3)(B).

3 ☐ For other offenses for which restitution is authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3663 and/or required by the sentencing guidelines, restitution is not ordered because the complication and prolongation of the sentencing process resulting from the fashioning of a restitution order outweigh the need to provide restitution to any victims under 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(B)(ii).

4 ☐ Restitution is not ordered for other reasons. (Explain.)

D ☐ Partial restitution is ordered for these reasons (18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)):

VIII ADDITIONAL FACTS JUSTIFYING THE SENTENCE IN THIS CASE (If applicable.)

Sections I, II, III, IV, and VII of the Statement of Reasons form must be completed in all felony cases.

Defendant's Soc. Sec. No.:
000-00-4486

Defendant's Date of Birth:
00/00/69

Defendant's Residence Address: Saugus, MA

Defendant's Mailing Address:
USP Big Sandy, KY

Date of Imposition of Judgment
07/17/06

/s/ Patti B. Saris
Signature of Judge

The Honorable Patti B. Saris
Judge, U.S. District Court
Name and Title of Judge

Date Signed 7/19/06

(2)

No. 07-181

FILED
SEP 19 2007
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
SUPREME COURT, U.S.

82

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

BRUCE TURNER

Petitioner

VS.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Respondent

Supplemental Brief For Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court of Appeals
For The First Circuit

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF

BRUCE TURNER, *Pro-Se*
No: 24622-038
UNITED STATES PENITENTARY
POST OFFICE BOX 1033
COLEMAN, FLORIDA 33521-1033

ARGUMENT

NOW COMES, the petitioner, Bruce Turner, Pro-se pursuant to the Supreme Court rule 15(8) and hereby moves to amend his petition for a **WRIT OF CERTIORARI** submitted to this court on July 11, 2007 and docketed on August 13, 2007. In support the petitioner asserts the following:

1). That the petitioner had help filing his petition.

2). That because of time retraints the petitioner was forced to relay the question that he wanted presented over the telephone.

3.) That the petitioner was unable to see the finished work product until after the petition was submitted to this court and finally,

4.) Although the questions presented are close to what the petitioner wanted some very important parts of them were lost in translation.

The petitioner very respectfully requests for the reasons stated that his questions be amended to be read as on the following page;

1). In light of this court's recent decision in **CUNNINGHAM v. CALIFORNIA, 549 U.S. ____ 2007** are a defendant's **SIXTH and FIFTH AMENDMENTS** rights violated when he is sentenced to a **"MINIMUM MANDATORY"** prison term under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because he was found at sentencing to have (3) **"PRIOR FELONY CONVICTIONS"** with aggravating circumstances (either violent felonies or serious drug offenses) by a judge but not even mentioined to the jury at trial where only one "simple" felony was proved?

2). Does the **ALMENDAREZ-TORRES, 523 U.S. 224 (1998)** "prior conviction exception" apply to a defendant whose sentence has been enhanced (by a judge's findings) under the Armed Career Criminal Act, relying on (3) prior felony convictions when that defendant went to trial before a jury in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) (felon in possession of a firearm) and only one prior felony was in the indictment brought before the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt?

Also, the petitioner wishes to add to the table of authorities in the petition on page iii, Amendment V of the United States Constitution.

And under **RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS I WISH TO QUOTE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT V**:

"No person shall be held to answer for capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; **NOR SHALL ANY PERSON BE SUBJECT FOR THE SAME OFFENSE TO BE TWICE PUT IN JEOPARDY OF LIFE OR LIMB**; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness, against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without **DUE PROCESS OF LAW**; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation."

The petitioner prays that you will allow his motion to Amend his petition for Writ of Certiorari.

Respectfully Submitted,

Bruce Turner

Bruce Turner, *Pro-Se*
No: 24622-038
U.S.P. Coleman I
Post Office Box 1033
Coleman, Florida 33521-1033

Date: August 30, 2007

72

(3)

No. 07-181

FILED
OCT 23 2007
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
SUPREME COURT, U.S.

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

BRUCE TURNER

Petitioner,

VS.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Respondent.

On Petition For Rehearing of Petition For Writ of Certiorari To The United States Court of Appeals For The First Circuit

PETITION FOR REHEARING

BRUCE TURNER, *Pro-Se*
Reg. No: 24622-038
USP COLEMAN #1
POST OFFICE BOX 1033
COLEMAN, FL 33521-1033

REQUEST TO GRANT PETITION

The petitioner, Bruce Turner, respectfully requests that this Honorable Court grant this Petition for Rehearing of the order denying his Peition for Writ of Certiorari dated October 1, 2007, and hear argument and address, "once and for all," the *Almendarez-Torres* prior conviction exception, and, even more specifically, how it relates to a defendant that went to trial before a jury.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Request to Grant Petition i
Table of Contents ii
Table of Authorities iii
Relevant Constitutional and Statutory Provisions 1
Argument 2-7
Conclusion 8
Certification of Pro Se Petitioner 9
Appendix A, Decision of the Supreme Court ..... App. 1

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES Page

Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998) 5, 6, 8

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) 6

Shephard v. United States, 125 S.Ct. 1254 (2005) 5, 6

State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) 5

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

Amendment V 5

Amendment VI 1, 5

STATUTES

18 U.S.C. § 922(g) 1, 2, 3

18 U.S.C. § 924(e) 1, 3

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

United States Constitution, Amendment VI

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . .

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and section 2

(g) It shall be unlawful for any person – (1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; section 2 – to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or trans-ported in interstate or foreign commerce.

18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2)

Whoever knowingly violates subsec tion . . . (g) . . . of section 922 shall be fined as provided in this title, imprinsoned not more than 10 years, or both.

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)

In the case of a person who violates 922(g) of this title, and has three previous convictions . . . for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both . . . , such person shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not less than fifteen years, and notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall not suspend the sentence of, or grant a probationary sentence of, such a person with respect to the conviction under section 922(g).

2

ARGUMENT

Picture, if you will, a man. A man with a loving mother, a young brother. And this man has a daughter. A beautiful little girl. He loves them all very much – and they love him too. Despite all of his shortcomings and bad choices in live – they still love him.

This man has had trouble in his life, and heartache, almost from the very beginning. His father was murdered when he was just six years old. His mom had a nervous breakdown because of it, so he and his brother must rely solely on his grandmother for just about everything, including what they will eat. His grandmother is everything to him – to them – and then she dies when he is in his early teens. He has watched her suffer for the past several years and whither away from breast cancer and chemotherapy. Life has done it to him again – to them – and things only get worse.

So what does the teen turn to? Alcohol. Not a good choice, but what does he know. It makes the pain bearable, if only for a little while – or so he thinks.

With alcohol comes the bad choices, and this teen starts to get into trouble with the law. Not major trouble, but trouble nonetheless. A fight every once in a while. An argument with a girlfriend, with some shoving on both of their parts. (Alcohol will do that.) And other things, but nothing that would lead anyone to believe that he's too far gone. No armed robberies, no burglaries, nothing that would say that he leads a life of crime. When he doesn't drink, he doesn't get into trouble – it's as simple as that.

This man is different when he's drinking. Alcohol changes him. He tries hard and stops. He's always successful for a while, and he does good, but when things start to haunt him again, he goes back to what he knows – alcohol. He goes on like this for many years.

This man was indicted in 2003 and charged in federal court with being a felon in possession of a firearm *(18 U.S.C. § 922(g))*. It was alleged that this man stored two firearms at someone's house. Nothing more than that – just simply stored them there. The guy who was arrested with the guns, at his own house, would never see jail. He is free. He just had to blame it on this man. Simple.

When this man is arraigned, his family is there to support him. When the clerk reads the charge and says that the penalty is *"a maximum of up to ten years in prison"* for violating *18 U.S.C. § 922(g)*, both he and his family are shocked. Ten years is such a long time to be facing.

While he sat in jail, *"without bail,"* he maintained his innocence. His family urged him to fight this. *"You must go to trial before a jury"* – so that's exactly what he did. He went to trial on the matter before a jury.

At his trial his lawyer acknowledged, *"with his consent,"* that he had previously been convicted of a crime punishable by one year in jail. A felony according to federal rules – even if the crime was just a misdemeanor. If it carries a jail sentence of one year *"its a felon"*. This stipulation was given to the jury. The government had now proved *"one felony"*. The only thing now left

to prove was, did this man possess the guns. And with the testimony of the man who was caught with the guns at his house, the jury found that he did. It was said that this man gave the guns to the man who was caught with them.

The man and his family were shocked by the verdict, but what could be done. A jury had found him guilty. Now the only thing to do was to wait for sentencing and hope for the best. Just maybe, all things taken into account, he would get less than the ten years. Surely a reasonable judge would not give him the whole ten years just for storing two firearms according to the jury's verdict.

At sentencing, while his family looks on in complete horror, this man is told by the judge that after a review of his criminal record, and finding that he had been convicted previously of three felonies, that she must now sentence him pursuant to the *"Armed Career Criminal Act"* (ACCA) *18 U.S.C. § 924(e)*, which carries a minimum mandatory prison sentence of fifteen years and a maximum penalty of life. *"Armed Career Criminal,"* his mother cries. *"He's not an armed career criminal. He's never done anything really bad. He's a good boy. What happened to the ten year maximum? He was told before he went to trial that the most he was facing was ten years. Isn't ten years the maximum?"* The judge replied, *"Well yes, but not in this case. Let me explain,"* said the judge. *"He was charged and convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm*, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), *which carries ten years, but having three prior convictions subjects him to a 'different maximum'."* *"What do you mean different maximum?"* *"There can only be*

one maximum penalty and we were told in this court that it was only ten years. No one told us of this ACCA. The jury was only told of one prior felony, not three. What is going on here?" The judge responds that the jury only has to hear of one felony and after that it is up to the judge to find the rest. *"If there are any more felonies on his criminal record, and if I determine that they are for either violent felonies or for any serious drug offense, I am forced to sentence him under the* Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). *My hands are tied."* This man was sentenced to 235 months (19.7 years), while his family looked on grief stricken.

His family says to the judge, *"How can this be? Why wasn't the jury told of any of this? How can you raise the maximum penalty and punish him for more prior crimes than were brought before the jury?"* *"How you ask,"* replies the judge. "I will tell you how. *There is a case called* Almendarez-Torres, *which says that prior convictions can be used to enhance a federal sentence and that they don't have to be proved to a jury."*

"Isn't that a violation of my son's constitutional right to a jury trial?" his mother wants to know. *"The Constitution is there to protect us from things like this."* The judge responds, *"Well, many people feel that it is a violation, but until the Supreme Court changes this law, that's just the way it is. You have a right to appeal."*

This man was me. And this family was my family. There are thousands of families just like us because of the *Almendarez-Torres Prior Conviction Exception.*

Numerous petitions are filed with the Supreme Court every term asking the court to take another look at the *Almendarez-Torres Case, 523 U.S. 224 (1998)*, and how it relates to the ACCA, but they are continually denied despite, as Justice Thomas concedes in *Shepard v. United States, 125 S.Ct. at 1264, "a majority of the courts now recognize that* Almendarez-Torres *was wrongly decided."* And the lower courts simply refuse to hear anything about it *"because it is the Supreme Court's perrogative alone to overrule one of its precedents," State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).* And as in *Turner v. U.S., 1st Circuit Decision dated April 18, 2007, "we will not anticipate an overrulling or a sharp limitation of* Almendarez-Torres *by the Supreme Court."*

These rulings are repeated on a daily basis throughout this country. No one wants to be responsible – "just in case". Each court puts it on another court to avoid being the one to deal with this issue. But this issue will not go away. It will continue to flood the courts and be the subject of countless appeals and petitions until it is finally dealt with. And why shouldn't it be dealt with? It's a constitutional matter. The people need closure on it.

Someone must take the first step and address the *Almendarez-Torres* issue, "once and for all," and this writer would suggest that it must be the United States Supreme Court.

As the court in Apprendi noted, "*Almendarez-Torres* raised no question concerning the right to a jury trial or the standard of proof that would apply to a contested issue of fact." (*Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. at 488).* The only issue was whether under the Fifth Amendment, the prior convictions should have been charged in the indictment. Since the Sixth Amendment issue was not factually or legally presented in *Almendarez-Torres*, that case should be seen only as a limited ruling on the Fifth Amendment indictment issue. Thus, *Almendarez-Torres* does not preclude application of Apprendi's Sixth Amendment ruling to prior convictions. (See Brief of *NACDL Amicus Curiae, Shephard v. United States, 125 S.Ct. 1254 (2005), pp. 7n.2, 8n3; Collen P. Murphy, The Use of Prior Convictions after Apprendi, 37 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 973, 974 (2004)*).

Almendarez-Torres is clearly in violation of an accused's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, especially when the accused went to trial before a jury in the first place. And it is the obligation and duty of this court, "The United States Supreme Court," to make sure, even if there's the slightest question that a law or a precedent is in violation of the Constitution, to address that issue and protect the rights of the people.

Families are being torn apart and ruined. Lives are being thrown away. And good people with much to offer society are being sent to prison, sometimes only because there are some underlying problems that can be fixed without putting them in prison for decades.

CONCLUSION

I pray that you will reconsider granting my Petition for Writ of Certiorari and finally deal with the *Almendarez-Torres* issues.

The courts need your guidance.

Respectfully Submitted,

Bruce Turner

BRUCE TURNER
Pro Se
Reg. No. 24622-038
U.S.P. Coleman 1
P.O. Box 1033
Coleman, FL 33521

Dated: October 23, 2007

CERTIFICATION OF PRO SE PETITIONER

I, Bruce Turner, filing *Pro Se*, do hereby swear and declare that to the best of my knowledge this peition is filed in compliance to the restricted grounds specified in *Supreme Court Rule 44(2)* and that it is filed in good faith and not for delay.

I declare under the pains and penalty for purjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Bruce Turner

APPENDIX A

Supreme Court of the United States
Office of the Clerk
Washington, DC 20543-0001

William K. Suter
Clerk of the Court
(202) 479-3011

October 1, 2007

Mr. Bruce Turner
Prisoner ID 24622-038
USP Coleman
P.O. Box 1033
Coleman, FL 33521

Re: Bruce Turner
v. United States
No. 07-181

Dear Mr. Turner:

The Court today entered the following order in the above-entitled case:

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

Sincerely,

William K. Suter

William K. Suter, Clerk